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Online social networks have become a key component of our digital presence. Users create profiles on 
these platforms using personal information, which helps others to identify them. Users connect to their 
friends, make new friends, and interact with each other via chat, like, retweet, comment, sharing files, etc. 
Most popular online social network platforms these days include Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, MySpace, 
Instagram, etc. All of these services operate separately. Users on one platform cannot connect and 
communicate with their friends on another platform. This study proposes “SocBridge” a novel way of 
connecting and communicating between users on different platforms. The framework acts as a proxy 
between participating service providers and thus protects the identity of communicating users, and 
preserves the business model of service providers.  
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Introduction 
When Social Networking services started in the mid-90s, no one knew how far it would go and what it 
would become. Starting as simple places to interact and share ideas, these services gained popularity 
rapidly. These services took a variety of ideas and evolved. Early 2000 were the golden years for online 
social networks when Friendster, MySpace, LinkedIn started and later joined by Facebook. Today these 
services are worth billions of dollars in market value. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become 
ubiquitous services today. OSNs attempt to create and mimic real-life social relationships in digital world. 
OSNs like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and MySpace are the main service providers. They have attracted 
millions of users. According to StatisticBrain, Facebook, the largest Online Social Network, has 1.4 billion 
users worldwide (StatisticBrain 2014), and the number is expected to grow continuously. Communication 
is one of the most important factors of human life that sets us apart (Deacon 1997) and it is the reason for 
the popularity of these websites too. OSNs provide services to allow users post their feelings, pictures, 
videos, and connect with like-minded people. People with similar interests can form groups and 
communicate, and share ideas. Friends can like posts, comment on them, and share them. These 
interactions allow users to connect and communicate with their friends and others through these 
platforms. This is the new form of communication and socialization in modern world. On average, users 
spend 15 hours 33 minutes per month using OSNs (StatisticBrain 2014). 
OSNs have evolved and are taking many different forms, for example: Facebook is general purpose OSN, 
LinkedIn is professional OSN, Twitter is for micro-blogging, and Instagram is for sharing pictures. 
Despite of the different purposes they satisfy, all OSNs share common principles, i.e., connection and 
communication. However, the problem with existing online social networks is that they operate 
separately. For example, Facebook users cannot communicate with Twitter users. Current OSN 
architecture has created a gap for cross platform communication. Because of this, users must create 
profiles on another platform to connect and communicate with their friends who belong to that platform. 
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This has raised many issues in OSNs in the digital world. First, it is really hassle to create multiple profiles 
with many service providers. Second, a user’s personal information will be exposed to multiple service 
providers. Third, because of the lack of a mechanism to let users know what information they share on 
one platform, there is risk that a user will reveal new information while creating profile on another 
platform resulting in unwanted personal information disclosure. Attacks are known and can be used to 
reveal the identity of a user on different platforms (Narayanan et al. 2009; Wondracek et al. 2010). Such 
attacks can be used to collect personal information of a user, which can be further used for many other 
malicious activities. Fourth, attackers can create a fake profile of a user on another platform, and connect 
to his/her friends to collect information about friends or launch social engineering attacks (Bilge et al. 
2009).  
This study proposes “SocBridge”, a novel way of connection and communication among users on different 
online social network platforms. SocBridge is a bridge that connects social service providers together and 
helps users to connect with each other across different platforms. The main contributions of the paper 
include: 1. It provides a vision for future OSNs, and 2. It studies privacy requirements for such framework. 
The proposed work is conducted in three phases: first, security requirements are examined; second, novel 
architecture is designed to address the usability as well as privacy requirements; and third, privacy 
violation possible scenarios from service providers and SocBridge itself is analyzed with respect to privacy 
requirements mentioned. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we study related 
works. In section 3, methodology is discussed. Requirements for such a system from stakeholders are 
discussed in section 4. The architecture of “SocBridge” is described in section 5, followed by analysis in 
section 6. Section 7 covers evaluation, and section 8 covers implications. Conclusion & future work is 
presented in section 9.  
Related Works 
Privacy in Online Social Networks is being studied for a long time. OSNs have been studied in the field of 
computer science, information systems, psychology, and sociology. Most of the studies focus on the 
privacy of user’s personal information or personally identifiable information (PII). The studies cover wide 
range of topics from information leakage, inference attacks, to relationship identification. Although a few 
architectures have been developed in the decentralized P2P OSNs (Buchegger et al. 2009; Cutillo et al. 
2009; Luo et al. 2009) to protect user privacy, the adoption of these architectures is questionable as per 
today’s situation. People are reluctant to migrate their information from existing providers to a new 
service provider (Theory of resistance). Some work has been done using cryptography to protect user’s 
information from the prying eyes of the service providers (Anderson et al. 2009; Guha et al. 2008; Lucas 
et al. 2008; Starin et al. 2009). Other studies propose architecture to protect user information from 
service providers (Anderson et al. 2009). All of the studies have provided significant contributions to the 
privacy and security of OSNs. However, none of these works have crossed the boundary of single service 
provider. Similar idea like the authors’ work can be found in chat functions of Skype (go to account 
settings), which works by linking accounts together. However, this does not support the functionalities the 
authors propose in the paper (it works for chat only). In addition, the privacy protection is questionable 
since these services are proprietary. Facebook and Twitter can be connected together to see the posts. 
However, the functionalities are limited and a user is required to have account on both platforms. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to resolve the problem using existing architecture of OSNs 
and propose vision for bridging of OSNs. 
The only work which tangentially discusses the similar concept as this paper is presented by Yeung et al 
(Yeung et al. 2009). However, their work is based on the concept of decentralization and does not 
consider the difficulty in paradigm shift, for example: usability, functionalities, and specially migration. 
The authors’ work can be implemented using existing architecture and existing service providers. 
Methodology 
This paper utilizes the Design Science research paradigm and applies the seven guidelines by Hevner et al. 
(2004), and Simon (1981). An artifact is designed to address a relevant IS problem that makes significant 
contribution. The research implements ‘Build and evaluate’ cycle for construction and evaluation of the 
artifact. The objective of this work is to propose middleware service for all online social networks, and 
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preserve the business interest of participating service providers, so that users in any platforms can 
communicate with their friends without boundaries.  
Requirements 
While designing such a system, user’s as well as the service provider’s concern should be addressed 
properly. If user’s concerns are not addressed, there will be no one to use the system (perceived usefulness 
(Davis 1989)). If the provider’s concerns are not addressed, such a system will not be put into practice. As 
expected, there are many requirements that need to be addressed. Here in this section, we will discuss 
some of those requirements. 
First and the most important concern is to protect user privacy. With the amount of personal information 
available with these services, people are concerned about their privacy. Many flaws have been detected on 
Facebook’s technology over the years, and it has risen bar for privacy in these services. Privacy policy 
conflicts (Liu et al. 2011), inference (Mislove et al. 2010), PII leakage (Krishnamurthy et al. 2009), and 
security attacks (Narayanan et al. 2009) are some of the problems. Particularly in our model, privacy 
concerns should be addressed from traffic analysis (PII leakage) and de-anonymization (Wondracek et al. 
2010). Communication requires the identity of the people/system participating. The objective here is to 
protect personal information of participating users from service providers and also prevent malicious 
attackers. 
Second concern is the functionality of the system. The designed system should bridge all the functionality 
of the existing OSNs and should not be limited to the function of connections only. Search, friend 
requests, wall postings, likes, comments, file sharing, and chat, are the examples of some of them. 
Without maintaining the functionality of the existing service providers, the adoption of the proposed 
system will be at risk. 
Third concern is from the service providers’ perspective. Such a system shall ensure that the business 
model of each participating service providers is not disturbed. The business model of existing service 
providers depends on their user information. User’s information is the commodity for the service 
providers and is often sold in the aggregated forms to marketing, potential advertisers, and others to 
generate revenue. It is important to protect the information of a user belonging to one service provider 
from leaking into the other participating service provider. For example: Facebook should not be allowed 
to gather user information from users who belong to Twitter, and likewise. This will ensure all 
participating service provider’s concerns (business model) are protected. 
For this study, we will address all of the issues discussed above. Finally, the system will be evaluated to 
meet these objectives. 
SocBridge 
Being aware of the importance of such bridging architecture for the future of OSN, we propose 
“SocBridge”, a framework connecting OSNs together. The framework currently meets three goals: 
• Connecting users across multiple platforms 
• Protecting privacy interests of users and business interests of service providers 
• Search and add, comment, like, retweet, and chat functionalities 
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Figure 1: SocBridge in action 
 
Before diving into the details, some of the terms are defined for ease of understanding. Primary service 
provider is the one where the (requesting) user has an account. Secondary service provider/s are the ones 
where user’s friends belong. For example: If Alice uses Facebook and wants to see what her friends on 
Twitter are doing then, Facebook is her primary service provider and Twitter is secondary service 
provider. There can be many secondary service providers for a user where her friends belong. Primary 
service provider and secondary service provider both maintain the SocID information of their registered 
users (when they register to use SocBridge) and the SocID of their friends (when a friend request is 
accepted) who use SocBridge.  
Register 
Users register with their names, email addresses, and service provider names (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) to 
the SocBridge. SocBridge will then generate a unique SocID upon successful registration and sends it to 
the user. Primary service providers will be notified that users are now also associated to SocBridge and 
their SocIDs will be sent as well. Primary service provider will store that user’s SocID for later use. At the 
client-side, private key and public key are generated. Public key is then sent to the SocBridge for future 
encryption processes. The user will then login to the primary service provider.  
Search and Add 
The basic assumption here is that a user knows the email address of his/her friends and their service 
providers. The user starts search with email address or SocID of a friend (which can also be shared out of 
band), SocBridge will check to see if the user is already registered. If the user is already registered, it will 
create FOAF file encrypting primary user’s information except SocID with public key of the searched user 
and send it to secondary service provider. Secondary service provider will forward request to the searched 
user as notification. If the user accepts the friend request, SocBridge will keep the friend relationship in its 
database and informs both primary and secondary service provider about the friend relationship between 
the users with their SocID. Service providers store the friendship information for future communication. 
If the user is not already registered to SocBridge, email request will be sent. 
 
Information Retrieval 
When a user logs into primary service provider, a request will be sent to SocBridge for any update on the 
user’s friend from secondary service provider/s. The request contains requesting user’s SocID and friend’s 
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SocID with secondary service provider’s name. SocBridge will create FOAF request file requesting updates 
on a user, then forwards it to secondary service provider along with requesting user’s public key. 
Secondary service provider will check the SocID for the relationship with the targeted user and upon 
verification, encrypts its user data with requestor’s public key. This way only the requesting user can get 
information about his/her friend on secondary domain and even SocBridge will have no idea about the 
content of communication. Figure 1 shows the communication process. 
 
 
          Figure 2: Internal Architecture of SocBridge 
 
Chat and other functions work similarly like information retrieval. The only difference is that a user has to 
initiate the communication unlike information retrieval where the updates are retrieved automatically. 
Public key are used to encrypt the content of communication.  
 
The FOAF file is looks like (more info at: (Dodds ; Project)): 
 
 
Figure 3: FOAF file generated for Like 
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Analysis 
This section analyzes the requirements with theoretical, internal (service providers and SocBridge) attack 
scenarios. The objective here is to test how much information service providers and SocBridge can learn 
about users and if they can collect extra information on users. 
Service Providers 
Service providers cannot be trusted not to sneak and try to collect information about the users from other 
platforms. In order to protect the identity and PII of the users communicating cross platforms, SocID and 
public key encryption is used. Encrypting personal information, comments, and messages with public 
keys protects the confidentiality of the communication and hence only the destined users can read it. 
Beside that, the request does not include details about the primary service provider where the user 
belongs. The only information that is available to the secondary service providers is SocID and requesting 
user’s public key, which does not tell much about a user and hence ensures identity protection. 
SocBridge 
It is possible that SocBridge administrators try to glean information about the users. The information that 
SocBridge stores during registration includes name, email, service provider, SocID, and public key of 
users. During the communication process, since the message is encrypted with destined user’s public key, 
SocBridge administrator cannot know the content of the message. However, the administrators can see 
where the request is generated and where it is forwarded with no knowledge about the content of the 
communication. 
Evaluation 
The evaluation can be performed with SocBridge implemented as cloud service. HTML5 and PHP can be 
used for interface development, and Javascript can be used for AES encryption. 256 bit keys will be used 
for private keys and public keys.  
Security measures such, as user’s personal information privacy will be tested with the help of traffic 
analysis and cryptanalysis. Inference as well as direct revelation of any user information is critical. 
Performance of the system will be tested for efficiency of encryption/decryption.  
Implications 
The implications of this work are manifold. First, it will become much easier for a user to create only one 
profile and use that to connect and communicate to his/her friends, despite which service providers they 
belong to. Second, user’s personal information will reside with only one service provider thereby 
minimizing the exposure of PII. Third, since each user has only one profile to manage, users have better 
knowledge about what information they are sharing, and control what information they want to share.  
Conclusion & Future Work 
SocBridge is presented as a middleware to bridge existing OSN service providers. This work is the very 
first step towards designing   architecture for the future OSNs where the users can connect and 
communicate with each other despite where their profile is located. The privacy requirements of the 
participating users as well as business model of participating service providers are protected using public-
key cryptography. The functionalities like search/add, comment, like, retweet, chat, and so on, are 
preserved. Although evaluation is theoretical, it is believed that such architecture is the future of OSNs 
and this work will play vital role in initiating the discussion. Future work will address the implementation 
of SocBridge, key management (distribution, revocation), access control, security challenges, and the 
performance of the system. 
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